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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2A-3(2)Q)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the 
written lease, which had been executed by Nielsen as lessor, was not enforceable 
against him. 
The standard of review for this legal conclusion is a correction of error 
standard. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995). This issue was 
preserved for appeal in the trial court at Record, pp. 197, 220-225. 
2. Whether the district court erred in holding that the parties' continuing 
performance in accordance with the terms of the written lease did not estop Nielsen, 
the lessor, from thereafter claiming that the lease was null and void. 
The standard of review as to this legal conclusion is a correction of error 
standard. Savage, supra. This issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court at 
Record, pp. 197,226-228. 
3. Whether the district court erred in determining that a month-to-month 
tenancy existed where the rent stated in the written lease was an annual figure payable 
in monthly installments. 
The standard of review as to this legal conclusion is a correction of error 
standard. Savage, supra. This issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court at 
Record, pp. 196-197, 226-227. 
4. Whether the district court erred in ordering a summary remedy where 
factual disputes existed. 
The standard of review as to the trial court's denial of the Motion for Relief 
from Judgment is an abuse of discretion standard. Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). This issue was preserved for review at Record, pp. 208-210, 
214-215,239-243. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1995) which states as follows: 
Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than 
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in 
lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants Colbys are the lessees of commercial premises from which they have 
operated a retail closeout and liquidation business, the "Super Savers Store," for 
approximately eight years. Respondent Nielsen is their lessor, who filed suit against 
the Colbys in May 1996 seeking termination of the tenancy and restitution of the 
premises on the basis of a letter/eviction notice providing approximately 30 days to 
vacate, which was given under the misapprehension that the Colbys were month-to-
month tenants, having allegedly failed to promptly sign a written lease. 
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The Colbys answered that they were properly in possessior i 
least- III in ill II k-d.v I II M i II , MrIsen and was therefore enforceable 
against him, that they were not under the terms of the lease, that they were 
not month-to-mor --^ess — of the 
premises. 
In conjunction with Nielsen's Complaint, an O re w "r< > 'ed, 
an id d I iiedii mi I Ii I 1 1 1 , I" i" ii it I hat time, the district court tnoK proffers 
of evidence and found that the lease had never been signed by the C > and tllat 
they appeared jf rear s ,," II, | ", " "'' i'' 11 >, i vore not a 
ground cited ii \ tl le lettei i ev iction notice, however.,) 
Unfortunately, IVIr,,, Colby was not present at this heai ii »g ai i > n sr 
c facts and did not dispute the district court's 
errone^ > idings and conclusions of law. Tu~ district court, mistaken about 
thefae .jble law, 01 cl ^sp.s^ -~~ premises 
t n^ei i. 
The Colbys' former counsel then filea « ...w* 
c * : - d affidavits correcting the previous factual errors upon 
which the district court's ruling was based,, The district cuurt den.^ 
dec.;;;._ ;~ entered an Ordei and Judgment of 
Restitution oi i Ju,, ., 
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The Colbys then retained new counsel, who promptly filed a Motion for Relief 
from Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Stay Pending Appeal with additional affidavits 
further clarifying the facts and a memorandum setting forth the controlling legal 
authorities. This motion was denied by the district court after hearing on August 12, 
1996. However, the court granted the Colbys' motion to stay the effect of its ruling, 
leaving the Colbys in possession, and this appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Nielsen is the owner of commercial premises located at 761 West 12th Street, 
Ogden, Utah. (Record, pp. 1, 37.) In March of 1989, the Colbys first began operating 
their "Super Savers Store" from the premises owned by Nielsen, pursuant to an oral 
lease. The initial rent was $400 per month, but the Colby's rent was subsequently 
increased to $700 per month. (Record, p. 69.) In 1992, another building was added 
and the rent was increased to $1,800 per month. Later, more space was again added 
and the rent was increased to $2,400 per month. (Record, p. 69.) 
In approximately October of 1995, the Colbys, concerned about the continuing 
rise in their rents, requested a written lease from Nielsen. (Record, p. 69.) A written 
lease was prepared by Nielsen stating a two-year term, and two originals, both signed 
by Nielsen in black ink, were presented to the Colbys in early October 1995. (Record, 
pp. 69-70, 132.) The lease provides, in part, as follows: "Term: This Lease 
commences on 1 October 1995 and continues for a period of twenty-four months." 
(Record, p. 122.) 
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The rent initially proposed by Nielsen in the written lease was $64,800 annually, 
payable in Ilil|l " ' " i 1" ' " | 'Iic,r instead agreed upon an annual 
rent of $52,800, payable in monthly installments of $4 4u MIS rem figure was 
immediately initia r* ...rv i,y „„. ., 
leases 'R** *»n-| pp 89 71) 122.) The relevant language provides, m part, as fol lows: 
"Mo J ousand Four Hundred Jollars (3>4.4uu; oasec 
annu *~^~ .*: - •$*.;• W 1 ' 'Record, 
pp. 122.) 
One original of the lease was signed by Ldi I "i i ill "i ' . il II M •« nil"" lini'" II i i nt 
I u, . — l i n a | w a s immediately returned to Nielsen. (Record, 
po 19 ; ; M- Uoibys sworn statement in this regard was never coi iti ovei it 11 > 
I -tainert " uie Colbys. Although it had 
bee,, „,y. ,^~ .y Nielsen in October 1995, it was not signed by the Colbys until this 
dispute with Nielsen arose, in in i inn JI I siyi IL I I IHI III I HI HI H IIII IIII I I ' 111 i II f i I i'' i 
, Mh 'i IIH' lease terms were agreed, signed by Nielsen, and the first copy signed by Carl 
Colby, the Colbys began paying r ent in the increased amount _ .. 
The Colbys' payments, including one or 
more payr ,-• • •> /ere made late or were slow in clear ir ig, wei e all accepted by 
Nielsen.,, 
Ovei the period of their tenancy, the Colbys have made substantial 
improvements to the leased premises, i n d u e , ,y 
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compartments and shelving, and they maintain about $200,000 worth of merchandise 
on the premises, of which approximately 75 percent is perishable. (Record, p. 70.) 
Nevertheless, by letter/eviction notice dated March 28, 1996, Nielsen informed the 
Colbys of his intent to evict them from the commercial premises on approximately 30 
days' notice. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.) The Colbys refused to voluntarily vacate the 
premises and continued to send rental payments to Nielsen, which he accepted. 
(Record, pp. 194-195.) 
In May 1996, Nielsen filed a Complaint against the Colbys alleging that they 
were month-to-month tenants as they had failed to sign the lease agreement in a timely 
manner and return it to him, that he believed the Colbys may be insolvent, that the 
written lease agreement was null and void as a contract offer which was withdrawn by 
Nielsen prior to acceptance by the Colbys, and that the Colbys were in unlawful 
detainer of the leased premises. The Complaint also sought an Order to Show Cause 
as to why possession should not immediately be restored to Nielsen. (Record, pp. 1-6.) 
An Order to Show Cause was issued, and a hearing was held on June 17, 1996. 
The Colbys were represented by counsel at the hearing, but were not personally 
present due to confusion as to the time of the hearing. (Record, pp. 20, 191-206.) At 
the Order to Show Cause hearing, then counsel for Colbys stipulated in error that the 
lease had not been signed by the Colbys, not realizing that the uncontested controlling 
facts already before the court were Nielsen's signature, the Colbys' performance, and 
Nielsen's acceptance. (Record, p. 203.) The district court held that the lease was an 
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offer by Nielsen that had been withdrawn before it was formally accepted by the 
C _ - - - - • - i 
month-to-month tenancy wt iich was effectively terminated as of the end of April 1996 
pursuant tc Il lilliii Ill" ". March 28, 1996 t.,_..,.. . 
Then f oibys immediately filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 
supported by affidavits, attempting to correct the factual errors made by the distr ict 
c ^-rmed 
that he hat n nnn iai of the written lease when it was first presented t< ! " ~ 
October 199o. and that ne nad returnea tr,.~ w.-.y...^ .. .At,,,.-
Nielsen to t lielsen at the til i le. (Record, p. 19., .. .^ v^oioy Affidavit and the affidavit of 
the bank teller Nielsen had allegedly talked with on June ^ i99b. also clarified that 
c st^ Lr " v account on 
June 17 1-wfi (Record ct> 17-18.20.) The trial court denied Colbys'Motion for 
Recon4 - . , j , .y ;:,_ .,~ ^ y l 
precedent of the lease cont;«wi • -cord, pp. 21 ^ 
The Colbys then retained new counsel, wt io promptly filed a 1VU, 
f * Stay Pending Appeal on the basis that the 
district cou'4 • : Jmg was based on errors of both fact and law. (P—~A ~v 44 -67 ) 
Specifical . ill), / 
Nielsen, which it was, in order to be enforceable against him. Farther, the Colbys cited 
the district court to facts already before the court at t.\c ;.;..*. -; trie ^ 
precluded a summary remedy. Alternatively, the Colbys argued that Nielsen's "offer" 
had been accepted by the performance of the parties, so that Nielsen was bound by, or 
at least estopped from, denying the validity of the lease. As a further argument, the 
Colbys contended that the statement of an annual rent figure created a year-to-year 
tenancy and that eviction was therefore improper on that basis as well. (Record, 
pp. 46-67, 219-243.) The district court denied this motion but stayed the execution of 
its order, and the Colbys appealed. (Record, pp. 142-143, 243.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The written lease signed by Nielsen as lessor should have been enforced 
against him, as nothing more than his signature is required under Utah law. In 
addition, the written lease was valid as between the Colbys and Nielsen, since each 
acknowledged acceptance of its terms by performance over an extended period. 
The equitable doctrine of estoppel also precluded Nielsen from denying that the 
lease was effective as between himself and the Colbys, since his conduct led them to 
rely on the protection of the lease and repudiation of his prior conduct, if allowed, would 
result in great injury to the Colbys. 
Finally, the tenancy created by the parties' conduct was at least a year-to-year 
tenancy, as rent is stated as an annual amount. The existence of this and other 
substantial factual disputes precluded the summary remedy of eviction. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE WRITTEN LEASE AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE 
AS AGAINST NIELSEN, THE LESSOR, WHO HAD SIGNED IT. 
The district court erred as a matter of law in refusing to enforce the lease against 
Nielsen, who had drafted, initialed and signed it. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1995) 
provides in part that: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, 
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
by whom the lease or sale is to be made. . . . 
(Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, as applicable in this case, in order for a lease for a 
period longer than one year to be enforceable against the lessor, it must be in writing 
and signed by the lessor. It clearly was. 
The case of Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) is instructive. Therein, Clayton Plastic Surgery argued that it was not 
bound by a lease because it had not signed the lease. This Court rejected that 
argument and specifically held that "The statute of frauds requires only that the 
document be signed by the party granting the lease." Id. at 33 (emphasis supplied). 
Utah law simply does not require that the tenant also sign the lease in order to render it 
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effective as against the landlord. There is no dispute as to the fact that at least one of 
the original leases presented to the Colbys in October 1995 was signed by Nielsen.1 
In the case of Edwards Pet Supply v. Bentley, 652 P.2d 889 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court upheld the validity of a lease where the lease had been signed by 
the landlord and there was a dispute as to whether or not the tenant had signed the 
lease. In addition, for 25 months the tenant had paid and the landlord had accepted, 
rent at the amount as set forth in the lease. The Supreme Court noted that, "The 
landlord's president admittedly signed the lease form, and the landlord admittedly 
accepted over two years' rental payments in the amount prescribed therein." Id. at 890. 
It is difficult to distinguish Edwards from the present facts. 
Under controlling Utah precedent, the written lease signed by Nielsen is 
unquestionably enforceable against him because he signed it. The trial court was 
aware the lease had been signed by Nielsen and committed clear error in concluding 
that the lease was not enforceable as against him. His order should be reversed. 
II. 
THE LEASE WAS ACCEPTED BY THE PARTIES' 
PERFORMANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS TERMS. 
In addition to signing the lease, Nielsen immediately began accepting the higher 
rent payments it required. Contemporaneous with the new lease document, the rent 
1
 Of course, the Colbys maintain that there were two originals and that they 
also signed one original of the lease at that time. However, the Colbys' signature is 
irrelevant to this argument. 
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jumped from $2,400 per month to $52,800 annually, paid at the rate of $4,400 per 
month. This fact is pivotal for, as the Court of Appeals in Clayton, supra, stated, "It is 
axiomatic that a party may become bound through its performance to a contract that it 
has not signed." Id. at 34. Even without a signature, acceptance of a lease can be 
demonstrated by performance, such as retaining possession, making of lease 
payments, and accepting lease payments. 
In the present case, both Nielsen and the Colbys performed in accordance with 
the terms of the written lease. The Colbys made substantially increased rent payments 
and Nielsen accepted those payments. This performance by the parties for a period of 
approximately six months is compelling evidence that both Nielsen and the Colbys 
considered the written lease to be binding as between them, had accepted its terms, 
and relied upon its protections. This evidence was ignored by the district court. 
Moreover, it is telling that even when Nielsen attempted to evict the Colbys, he thought 
it necessary to acknowledge the existence of the written lease in his Complaint and 
then allege that it was null and void. (Record, pp. 3-4.) 
Accordingly, the district court also erred when it found that the Colbys had not 
accepted the lease because they had not signed and notarized it. First, notarization 
does not, of course, affect the validity of contracts, but merely establishes their 
authenticity or to allow recordation. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1 (1994). See also, 
Smalley v. Juneau Clinic BIdg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972) (failure of parties to 
lease to comply with mandatory acknowledgment requirement of statute affected only 
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recordation and admissibility, and did not make the conveyance void as between the 
parties). Therefore, it could not have been a condition precedent to the validity of the 
lease. Second, even disregarding the statement in Carl Colby's affidavit that he had 
signed the lease, the Colbys demonstrated their acceptance of its terms by payment of 
the greatly increased rent over an extended period of time. As noted, Nielsen clearly 
accepted those payments. Nielsen was therefore not free to withdraw his "offer" in 
March 1996 because it had been previously accepted by performance. 
III. 
NIELSEN IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE 
VALIDITY OF THE WRITTEN LEASE. 
The equitable doctrine of estoppel requires: 
(1) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent 
with the claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) Action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement, or act, and 
(3) Injury to such other party resulting from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
admission, statement, or act. 
Consolidation Coal v. Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994). See, 
also, Crismon v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (equitable estoppel is "conduct by one party which leads another party, in 
reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first 
party is permitted to repudiate his conduct"). 
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In the case at bar, there is no factual dispute that Nielsen offered a written lease 
to the Colbys and then accepted substantially increased rental payments from them 
over a period of six months as if the written lease were in effect. In demonstrable 
reliance on the protection of the lease, the Colbys maintained the premises, promoted 
their business, continued to establish their good will at that location, and maintained 
perishable and other inventory worth approximately $200,000. Then, Nielsen suddenly 
and inconsistently claimed that the written lease was null and void (on grounds other 
than nonpayment of rent) and attempted to evict the Colbys from their business 
premises of seven years upon an impossible 30 days' notice. 
If Nielsen is permitted to repudiate both his contract and his prior conduct, the 
Colbys will be substantially injured. It is simply not practical for them to move the entire 
inventory they maintain at the "Super Savers Store" in a few days, especially where 
they have reasonably relied upon the protection of a two-year lease, and it is also not 
fair to allow Nielsen to hold the threat of summary eviction over their heads. 
Based on the undisputed course of dealing between the parties, including 
Nielsen's conduct which led the Colbys to believe that they had a two-year lease, it was 
error to order that Nielsen could summarily evict the Colbys. The district court erred in 
this regard as a matter of law and its order should be reversed. 
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IV. 
SUMMARY EVICTION WAS ALSO IMPROPER BECAUSE 
THE TENANCY CREATED BY THE PARTIES WAS, 
AT A MINIMUM, A YEAR-TO-YEAR TENANCY. 
The written lease executed by the parties was for a two-year term, October 1995 
to October 1997. The lease specifically states as follows: "Term: This Lease 
commences on 1 October 1995 and continues for a period of twenty-four months." The 
lease additionally provides that the "annual base rent" is $52,800, which is payable in 
monthly base rent installments of $4,400. The contemplation of the parties was 
obviously the creation of a tenancy of a two-year duration. 
Even assuming that the lease was not valid, since rent is stated annually, the 
tenancy created was no less than year-to-year. At common law, the payment and 
acceptance of rent thus calculated would have created no less than a year-to-year 
tenancy. Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d 438 (Utah 1968). Such a holding makes 
particular sense in a commercial context where substitute space is not readily available 
and large amounts of perishable goods are involved. 
The district court erred in concluding that the tenancy created by the Colbys' 
payment of rent, and Nielsen's acceptance of that rent, was no more than a month-to-
month tenancy and thus allowed eviction on 30 days* notice. Although the Colbys paid 
rent on a monthly schedule, in fact the rent due and owing was an annual rent, and 
there is no evidence in the record to the contrary. Summary eviction was thus 
improper. 
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V. 
SUMMARY EVICTION WAS ALSO IMPROPER BECAUSE 
OF THE EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL FACTUAL DISPUTES. 
The Colbys respectfully submit that the district court's order should be reversed 
as a matter of law on the grounds set forth in the preceding arguments. Even if 
reversal were not available, however, factual disputes would still require vacation of the 
order. Eviction is a severe remedy, particularly in a commercial setting where 
perishable inventory is involved. Because of the material factual disputes regarding 
two original leases, Carl Colby's signing and return of the lease to Nielsen, the parties' 
intent regarding notarization, etc., the summary remedy of eviction was improper as a 
matter of law. 
In the case of D&L Enterprises, Inc. v. Davenport, 507 P.2d 373 (Utah 1973), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that factual issues relating to a commercial lease dispute 
precluded summary eviction. Therein, a five-year lease with an option to renew for ten 
years was at issue. Thirty-five days before the end of the initial term, the plaintiff 
served a notice to vacate on the defendant, alleging breach of the terms of the lease 
other than failure to pay the rent. On appeal, the defendant argued that in light of 
contested facts, the trial court's entry of summary judgment was error. The Supreme 
Court agreed, finding that, "This record reflects contradiction in it that we consider 
presents issues of fact. . . . We think this case must be tried before a court or a jury, on 
its merits, and not by way of summary judgment." Id. at 374. 
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Here, too, the factual record below contains significant disputes. Although these 
material factual issues were initially not clearly laid out for the district court, they were 
ignored after they were brought to its attention both in the Colbys' Motion for 
Reconsideration and for Stay of Execution, and their subsequent Motion for Relief from 
Judgment, or in the Alternative, to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal. 
At that point, the existence of these substantial factual issues, which included 
matters set forth in the findings of fact entered by the district court as a basis for its 
Order and Judgment of Restitution, precluded the district court, as a matter of law, from 
permitting its summary order of eviction to remain in force. Accordingly, the trial court, 
in denying the Colbys' motion for relief, abused its discretion. Its order should 
therefore be vacated on that ground. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellants Carl and Marie Colby, dba Super 
Savers Store, respectfully request that this Court reverse the Order and Judgment of 
Restitution entered by the lower court as a matter of law and award them their costs 
incurred herein and attorney's fees in accordance with paragraph 18.08 of the lease. 
Dated this 21 st day of January, 1997. 
CLYDE, SNOW & SWENSON 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
ANNELI R. SMITH 
AMANDA D. SEEGER 
Attorneys For Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellants' Brief to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this 21st day of 
January, 1997: 
Jeff R. Thome, Esq. 
Mann, Hadfield & Thome 
98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Tabl 
Jeff R Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne, #3250 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone 723-3404 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DARRELL NIELSEN, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL COLBY and MARIE COLBY, 
his wife, dba SUPER SAVERS 
STORE, 
Defendants. 
) ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
OF RESTITUTION J\Jl ^ 
) Civil No. 960900192EV 
) Judge: Stanton M. Taylor 
This matter came on for hearing before the above-entitled 
Court on the 17th day of June, 1996 at the hour of 10:30 a.m. 
The plaintiff was present in court and was represented by his 
counsel of record, Jeff R Thorne of the firm of Mann, Hadfield 
and Thorne. The defendant was not present, but was represented 
by Richard Medsker of the firm of Farr, Kaufman, Sulllivan, 
Gorman, Jensen, Medsker & Perkins. The parties made "proffers" 
to the court and stipulated that the evidence presented by the 
proffers was accurate for purposes of the hearing. The court 
having heard the evidence, makes the following Findings of Fact. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1 . The plaintiff, Darrell Nielsen, is a resident of 
Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah, and owns certain real 
property with a street address of 761 West Twelfth Street, Ogden, 
Utah 84404. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court. 
2. The defendants, Carl Colby and Marie Colby, his wife, 
are doing business as Super Saver Stores, and have been occupying 
as tenants the real property owned by Darrell Nielsen with a 
street address of 761 West Twelfth Street, Ogden, Utah 84404. 
3. In the fall of 1995, plaintiff indicated that he would 
have to have a Lease Agreement to continue the tenancy with the 
defendants. The plaintiff presented a Lease Agreement to be 
signed by the defendants sometime the first part of October, 
1996. 
4. The defendants did not sign the Lease Agreement until 
after an "eviction notice" was served upon them. A copy of the 
Lease Agreement was received by the court as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 1. A copy of the "eviction notice" was received as Plaintiff 
Exhibit # 2. 
5. From October 1995 through March 28, 1996, the plaintiff 
made several phone calls on a monthly basis to the defendants to 
ask that the Lease Agreement be signed and returned. The 
defendant did not return many of the calls. When conversation 
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were had with the defendant, Mr. Colby, he said he would have to 
get his wife to sign the lease. 
6. The defendants issued two checks for rent payments 
which failed to clear the bank because of insufficient funds in 
defendants' bank account. A check was returned to plaintiff 
dated March 15, 1996, which the defendant gave a "cashier's 
check" to pay the bounced check, and said, "I have to give 
cashier's checks to everyone, now." 
7. The plaintiff, Darrell Nielsen, revoked or withdrew his 
offer for the lease, and personally delivered to the defendants 
an eviction notice, which was personally served upon Carl Colby 
on March 28, 1996. Carl Colby initialed the eviction notice. 
8. The eviction notice apprised Carl Colby that he was to 
vacate the premises at the end of April, 1996. 
9. The defendants never signed the Lease Agreement prior 
to the eviction notice. The defendants admit that they signed 
the Lease after they received the eviction notice, and Carl Colby 
actually signed the Lease in the law firm of his attorney after 
he brought in the eviction notice. Mr. Colby dated his signature 
as "10-6-95" even though it was not signed by him until April, 
1996. The lease contained "notary" clauses, to notarize the 
parties signatures, which were not signed by notary publics. 
10. Since the eviction notice, Carl Colby issued a check 
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for rent dated April 15, 1996, which was returned to the 
plaintiff because of insufficient funds in the defendants' bank 
account. 
11. At the date of the hearing, the plaintiff had five (5) 
payment checks from Carl Colby which he had not presented for 
payment, because plaintiff did not want to incur the expense of 
the bank charges for having the checks returned. The plaintiff, 
had checked with the bank upon which the defendants' checks were 
drawn, and only one of the checks would clear the bank the 
morning of the hearing. 
12. At the time the eviction notice was served upon the 
defendants, the defendants were month-to-month tenants under 
tenancy at will with the plaintiff. 
13. The eviction notice was served upon the defendants on 
March 28, 1996, and gave them to the end of April to vacate the 
premises. 
14. The defendants have failed to vacate the premises as 
required by the eviction notice. 
15. The monthly rent which the defendants owe to the 
plaintiff is the sum of $4,400.00 per month. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, IT IS HEREBY, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. No valid lease exists between plaintiff and defendants, 
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for the reason that the plaintiff had revoked or withdrawn his 
offer to enter into the lease prior to the time the defendants 
accepted the lease. 
2. At the time of service of the eviction notice, which 
was received by the court as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, the 
defendants were occupying the premises on a month-to-month lease, 
and the notice gave defendants more than the time required under 
the unlawful detainer statutes of the State of Utah to vacate the 
premises. 
3. The defendants have failed to vacate the premises as 
required by state law. 
4. The plaintiff is entitled to possession of the 
premises, and the defendants are ordered to vacate the premises, 
to remove their personal property, and to restore the premises to 
the plaintiff, or be forcibly removed by the Sheriff or Constable 
of Weber County. The defendants are to vacate the premises 
within three (3) business days following service of the Order, 
unless the plaintiff agrees to any longer time. If the plaintiff 
agrees to any longer time, it shall be in writing so there is no 
misunderstanding as to how long the defendants have to vacate the 
premises. A copy of this Order of Restitution shall be served 
upon the defendants in accordance with Rule 4 of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, by a person authorized to serve process pursuant 
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to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-58. If personal service is impossible 
or impractical, service may be made by mailing a copy of the 
Order and form to the defendants' last known address and posting 
a copy of the Order at a conspicuous place on the premises of 761 
West Twelfth Street, Ogden, Utah 84404. The date of service, the 
name, title, signature and telephone number of the person serving 
the order shall be legibly endorsed on a copy of the order served 
upon the defendant, and the person serving the order shall file 
proof of service in accordance with Rule 4(h) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
5. If the defendant fails to comply with this order within 
the time prescribed by this court, a sheriff of constable of 
Weber County, at plaintiff's direction, may enter the premises by 
force using the least destructive means possible to remove the 
defendant. Any personal property of the defendants may be 
removed from the premises by the sheriff of constable and 
transported to a suitable location for safe storage. The sheriff 
or constable, with the plaintiff's consent, may delegate 
responsibility for storage to the plaintiff, who must store the 
personal property in a suitable place and in a reasonable manner. 
6. The personal property removed and stored shall be 
inventoried by the sheriff or constable who shall keep the 
original inventory and personally deliver or mail the defendants 
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a copy of the inventory immediately after the personal property 
is removed. After demand by the defendant within 30 days of 
removal of personal property from the premises, the sheriff or 
constable shall promptly return all of the defendants' personal 
property upon payment of the reasonable costs incurred for its 
removal and storage. If the storage costs are not paid, then 
pursuant to the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-36-10.5, the 
property may placed for a public sale. 
7. The court will reserve the issue of past due rents, 
treble damages and attorney fees until a final hearing on this 
matter. 
DATED this / day of> 
i77rAYEo 
CpURff/j 
STANTON M./TAYLOR 
DISTRICT DURA JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE UPON OPPOSING COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, counsel for the defendant hereby certifies that 
on the /& day of June, 1996, he served a copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION upon Richard Medsker, 
Attorney for Defendants, Bamberger Square Building, 205 26th .^  
Street, Suite 34, Ogden, Utah 84401, by mailing a copy this lb 
day of June, 1996. 
U < VH 
Jef fHre Thorne 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Notice of objection to the proposed documents must be 
submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days after 
service. 
pj/2:nielsen.ord 
8 
Tab 2 
Jeff R Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne, #32 50 ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main 
P. O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone 723-3404 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DARRELL NIELSEN, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. J 
CARL COLBY and MARIE COLBY, ] 
his wife, dba SUPER SAVERS 
STORE, 1 
Defendants. ] 
> ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
I Civil NO. 960900192EV 
I Judge: Stanton Taylor 
This matter came on before the court, the Honorable Stanton 
Taylor, District Judge, presiding on the 29th day of July, 1996 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m. The plaintiff was represented by his 
counsel of record, Jeff R Thorne of the firm of Mann, Hadfield 
and Thorne. The defendants were represented by their counsel of 
record, Edward C Barnes of the firm of Clyde, Snow & Swenson, 
P.C. The court heard the arguments of counsel for plaintiff and 
counsel for defendants, and the court being fully advised issues 
the following order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion 
for Relief from Judgment is denied, the court ruling as a matter 
of law that no valid lease existed between plaintiff and 
defendants, and the court reaffirming its prior order in this 
matter. The court further finding that this constitutes a final 
order on the eviction action, the court having specifically 
reserved issues of damages and attorney's fees for a future 
hearing. 
DATED this f day of August, 1996. 
STANTON TAYLOR 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the £&- day of August, 1996, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion for Relief 
From Judgment to Edwin C. Barnes, CLYDE, SNOW & SWENSON, P.C., 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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